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Abstract: With the widespread adoption of the quantified self movement, an increasing number
of users rely on mobile applications to monitor their physical activity through their smartphones.
However, granting applications a direct access to sensor data expose users to privacy risks. In
particular, motion sensor data are usually transmitted to analytics applications hosted on the cloud,
which leverages on machine learning models to provide feedback on their activity status to users.
In this setting, nothing prevents the service provider to infer private and sensitive information
about a user such as health or demographic attributes. To address this issue, we propose DySan, a
privacy-preserving framework to sanitize motion sensor data against unwanted sensitive inferences
(i.e., improving privacy) while limiting the loss of accuracy on the physical activity monitoring (i.e.,
maintaining data utility). Our approach is inspired from the framework of Generative Adversarial
Networks to sanitize the sensor data for the purpose of ensuring a good trade-off between utility
and privacy. More precisely, by learning in a competitive manner several networks, DySan is able
to build models that sanitize motion data against inferences on a specified sensitive attribute (e.g.,
gender) while maintaining an accurate activity recognition. DySan builds various sanitizing models,
characterized by different sets of hyperparameters in the global loss function, to propose a transfer
learning scheme over time by dynamically selecting the model which provides the best utility
and privacy trade-off according to the incoming data. Experiments conducted on real datasets
demonstrate that DySan can drastically limit the gender inference up to 41% (from 98% with raw
data to 57% with sanitized data) while only reducing the accuracy of activity recognition by 3%
(from 95% with raw data to 92% with sanitized data).
Key-words: privacy, articifial intelligence, transparency, health data, confidentiality
DySan: Assainissement dynamique des données de capteur
de mouvement contre l’inférence d’informations sensibles à
partir de réseaux adversariaux
Résumé : Avec l’adoption généralisée du suivi d’activité, un nombre croissant d’utilisateurs
s’appuient sur des applications mobiles pour surveiller leur activité physique par le biais de leur
smartphone. Le fait d’accorder aux applications un accès direct aux données des capteurs expose
les utilisateurs à des risques pour leur vie privée. En effet, ces données de capteurs de mouvement
sont généralement transmises à des applications d’analyse hébergées sur le cloud, qui exploitent
des modèles d’apprentissage machine pour fournir aux utilisateurs un retour d’information sur
leur santé. Cependant, rien n’empêche le fournisseur de services d’inférer des informations privées
et potentiellement sensibles sur un utilisateur, telles que des attributs démographiques ou de
santé.
Dans cet article, nous présentons DySan, un système de préservation de la vie privée pour
assainir les données provenant de capteurs de mouvement contre les inférence non désirées
d’informations sensibles (c’est-à-dire améliorer la vie privée) tout en limitant la perte de précision
sur la surveillance de l’activité physique (c’est-à-dire maintenir une certaine utilité dans les
données protégées). Pour garantir un bon compromis entre utilité et respect de la vie privée,
DySan s’appuie sur des Réseaux génératifs Adversariaux (GAN) pour assainir les données issues
des capteurs. Plus précisément, en apprenant de manière compétitive plusieurs réseaux, DySan
est capable de construire des modèles d’apprentissage machine qui assainissent les données de
mouvement contre l’inférence d’un attribut sensible spécifié (par exemple, le genre) tout en
maintenant une grande précision sur la reconnaissance d’activité. De plus, DySan construit
divers modèles d’assainissement, caractérisés par différents ensembles d’hyperparamètres dans la
fonction de perte globale, pour proposer un schéma d’apprentissage du transfert dans le temps en
sélectionnant dynamiquement le modèle qui offre le meilleur compromis entre utilité et respect de
la vie privée en fonction des données entrantes.
Les expériences menées sur des ensembles de données réels montrent que DySan peut limiter
considérablement l’inférence de genre jusqu’à 41% (de 98% avec des données brutes à 57% avec
des données assainies) tout en ne réduisant la précision de la reconnaissance d’activité que de 3%
(de 95% avec des données brutes à 92% avec des données assainies)
Mots-clés : vie privée, intelligence artificielle, transparence, données de santé, confidentialité
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1 Introduction
The integration of motion sensors in smartphones and wearables has been accompanied by the
growth of the quantified self movement [36]. For instance nowadays, users increasingly exploit
these devices to monitor their physical activities. Usually, the motion sensor data are not analyzed
directly on the device but are rather transmitted to analytics applications hosted on the cloud.
These analytics applications leverage machine learning models to compute statistical indicators
related to the status of users that are send back to them. While these analyses can bring many
benefits from the health perspective [11, 24, 26], they can also lead to privacy breaches by exposing
personal information regarding the individual concerned. Indeed, a large range of inferences can
be done from motion sensor data including sensitive ones such as demographic and health-related
attributes [12, 14, 15].
Consider for instance the scenario in which Alice, a woman, uses a fitness application on her
smartphone to monitor her physical activity. The application performs the activity recognition
as well as the activity monitoring on the cloud. However even if the service provider declares
that it will never do it, Alice has no formal guarantees that her data will not be processed to
infer other information about her (e.g., for targeting or marketing purposes). Another possible
scenario is related to the new trend of insurance companies that propose discount to clients if
they accept to use a connected device to follow their daily activity [33]. These data can be used
to provide a personalized coaching for better health management but also for early detection of a
pathology, which can negatively impact the insurance cost or lead to other type of discrimination.
To address the issues raised by these scenarios, in this work we propose a solution sanitizing the
motion sensor data in such a way that it hides sensitive attributes while preserving the activity
information contained in the data.
To achieve this objective, we design DySan, inspired from the framework of Generative
Adversarial Networks (GANs) [23] to sanitize the sensor data. More precisely, by learning in
a competitive manner several networks, DySan is able to build models sanitizing motion data
to prevent inferences on a specified sensitive attribute while maintaining a high level of activity
recognition. In addition, by limiting the distortion between the raw and sanitized data, DySan
also maintains a high level of utility with respect to other analysis tasks related to activity
monitoring (e.g., steps counting).
Furthermore, our approach aims at addressing the heterogeneous aspect of sensor data, which
is inherent to the way each user moves, to the characteristics of the device used for data collection
and to the evolution of activity during the day. Thus, as one sanitizing model cannot provide
the best utility and privacy trade-off for all users over time, DySan builds a set of diverse
sanitizing models by exploring different combination of hyperparameters balancing loss functions
of activity recognition, sensitive inference and data distortion terms. By doing so, DySan is able
to dynamically select the model which provides the best trade-off over time according to the
incoming sensor data.
The evaluation of DySan on real datasets, in which the gender is considered as the sensitive
information to hide, demonstrates that DySan can drastically limit the gender inference up to
41% while only inducing a drop of 3% on the accuracy of activity recognition. In addition to
preserve activity recognition, DySan, by limiting data distortion, also preserves the sensor data
utility for other analytical tasks such as estimating the number of steps. Moreover, we show that
the dynamic model selection of DySan successfully provides an adaptation of the sanitization
according to the incoming user data. This dynamic model selection is specially useful to transfer
learning from the dataset used to build the sanitizer models to another dataset with new users
with potentially different data distribution. Our dynamic sanitization method overcomes several
shortcomings of the state-of-the-art approaches, namely the use of the same sanitization model
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for all users over time, which may lead to a poor privacy-utility trade-off for atypical users. Lastly,
we evaluate the cost of operating DySan on a smartphone and show that the introduced overhead
is compatible with real-time processing and that the energy consumption remains reasonable.
Our implementation of DySan as well as the datasets used to assess its performances are publicly
available 1
The outline of the paper is as follows. First, the problem definition and the considered system
model are described in Section 2. Then, DySan is presented in Section 3 before reviewing the
experimental setting as well as the results obtained, respectively in Section 4 and Section 5.
Finally, the related work is discussed in Section 6 before concluding in Section 7.
2 Problem definition and system model
We consider a mobile application installed on the user’s smartphone aiming to monitor its physical
activity. The smartphone of the user is assumed to be trusted. For instance, we consider that
DySan could be deployed in the trusted environment of the smartphone to prevent the mobile
application to have a direct access to the sensor data but only from the output of DySan (thus
ensuring that the mobile application uses only sanitized data). Afterwards, the mobile application
sends the sanitized data to a server hosted on the cloud. This server leverages machine learning
models to identify the activity of the user or to estimate other physical activity features (e.g.,
number of steps). The server is considered to follow the honest-but-curious adversary model in
the sense that it may also try to infer additional sensitive information from the sensor data. For
the rest of the paper, we consider the gender as being the sensitive attribute to protect. Note
however that our approach is much more generic and could be applied to protect other sensitive
attributes (e.g., handicap). This choice is only motivated by the availability of different datasets
with this information. Note also that the gender could be inferred from the list of performed
activities and their associated frequencies in case of unbalanced data distribution between men
and women (which is not the case in the datasets considered in this paper).
We consider raw motion sensor data (denoted by A) captured through accelerometer and
gyroscope that sample 3-axial signals with a frequency of 50 Hz. To enable activity recognition
over time, the raw sensor data are split in sliding windows, in which each sliding window is
considered to be a sample of a single activity (i.e., by assumption the user cannot perform two
different activities during a single sliding window). The datasets used are composed of four type
of dynamic activities (i.e., walking, running, climbing and going down stairs), and we chose the
length of sliding window to match a walking cycle of two steps. The choice of the window size is
not trivial, especially for an activity recognition task, and has to be well calibrated. Indeed, a
small window size could split an activity signal while large window size could contain multiple
activity signals. Knowing that in average the walking pace is not less than 1.5 steps per second
[4], the window length T is chosen to be 2.5 seconds with an overlap of 50 %.
We assume a population of N users contained in a dataset X storing all users data. This
dataset includes the raw sensor data as well as the label associated to the activity performed by
the user (denoted by a multi-valued attribute Y ), the binary sensitive attribute (denoted by S)
and a timestamp. Thus, the dataset X = {A,Y,S} in which A = (A1, . . . ,AT ).
The objective of DySan is to protect the user motion sensor data against sensitive attribute
inferences while maintaining data utility. More formally, we aim at learning a set of sanitizers
Sanα,λ,β for various values of the hyperparameters α, λ and β. Each sanitizer will transform the
original data X into X̄ = Sanα,λ,β (X) = {Ā,Y,S}; Ā = (Ā1, ¯. . ., ĀT ). This set of sanitizers is
learned so that it is difficult to build a discriminator Disc trained to predict S from the sanitized
1DySan: https://github.com/DynamicSanitizer/DySan
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data and activities {ĀY} while an activity predictor Pred trained on the same sensor data (Ā)
is able to maintain an accuracy close to the original one. To further preserve the utility of X̄,
we also constrain the sanitization process to minimize the distortion between the original and
sanitized data.
Furthermore, DySan aims to dynamically adapt over time the hyperparameters of the model
according to the incoming data of each user. Indeed, while a particular model could provide
the best utility/privacy trade-off on average for all users with respect to training dataset, the
model leading to the best trade-off can change when testing on new user (e.g., when the new
user data does not fit the data distribution of the training dataset). More formally, we aim to
find for each window of data the sanitizer ̂Sanα,λ,β providing the best utility/privacy trade-off for
the current incoming data. This trade-off is defined by a metric combining the accuracy of the
activity recognition and the inference of the sensitive attribute.
3 DYSAN: Dynamic Sanitizer
Figure 1: Overview of dynamic sanitizer.
An overview of DySan is shown in Figure 1. To avoid an unwanted exploitation of the
motion sensor data, these data are sanitized by DySan before being transmitted to the mobile
application. This sanitizing process removes the correlations with S in the sensor data while
preserving the information necessary to detect the activity performed by a user. In addition,
DySan also aims at limiting the distortion between the raw and sanitized data to preserve the
utility for other analytical tasks. Finally, the resulting sanitized data are sent to an analytics
application hosted on the cloud, exploiting machine learning models to classify the users activity
and compute statistics related to their physical activity. Before exploiting DySan, multiple
sanitizers corresponding to various utility and privacy trade-offs are built during the training.
These models are then deployed on the smartphone. During the online phase, DySan selects the
best sanitizer for the associated user. Both the training and the online phases are summarized in
Figure 2 and explained in the following subsections.
3.1 Building multiple sanitizers
The training phase is performed only once and aims at learning multiple sanitizers. This training
is performed with a reference dataset used in activity recognition, the MotionSense dataset that
we describe in Section 4.1. As shown in Figure 2, DySan is composed of multiple building
blocks that we detail hereafter: 1) a sanitizer, 2) a discriminator, 3) a predictor, 4) a distortion
measurement and 5) a multi-objective loss function.
• Discriminator: The discriminatorDisc guides the sanitizer through the process of removing
information related to the sensitive attribute S ∈ {0, 1}. In practice, we use a Convolutional
Neural Network (CNN), which is well-suited to capture time-invariant features in time
series [9]. The architecture of this CNN is presented in Appendix A.1. The discriminator is
trained to infer the sensitive information from the output of the sanitizer. The training of
the discriminator is based on a loss function measuring the Balanced Error Rate BER [10]




Figure 2: Dynamically sanitizing motion sensor data with DySan framework during the training (left)
and the online (right) phases. Training phase allows to build different models that are distinguished by








P (Disc(Ā,Y) 6= s|S = s)). (1)
The value of BER ranges between 0 and 0.5, in which a value close to 0 corresponds
to a perfect accuracy for the prediction of the sensitive attribute while 0.5 means the
discriminator is unable to retrieve any information about the sensitive attribute from the
sanitized data. Hereafter, we will refer to this loss by LossSensitive.
• Predictor: The predictor Pred aims at helping the sanitizer in preserving as much infor-
mation as possible with respect to the activity recognition task. We also use a CNN for the
predictor that has been optimized for predicting the user activity from the sanitized data.
The architecture of this CNN is presented in Appendix A.2. Thus, the predictor is trained
to maximize the accuracy in inferring activities from the output of the sanitizer. We also
use the balanced error rate as the loss function that should minimize the error between the
output of the predictor and the ground truth of the activity: BER(Pred(Ā), y). For the
rest of the paper, we will refer to the predictor loss as LossActivities.
• Distortion measurement: The last constraint on the sanitizer is the minimization of
data distortion between the raw and sanitized data. Specifically, this distortion should be
limited to keep as much information as possible in the sensor data for subsequent analytical
tasks. The data distortion is measured through the L1 loss function denoted l1, applied
independently on each attribute. For two vectors Ai and Āi, corresponding respectively to






|aij − āij |, (2)
in which NA is the number of possible values for a particular attribute (e.g., the number of
axes of the accelerometer or the gyroscope), aij ∈ Ai and i denotes a single observation in
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the window of length T .
• Sanitizer: The sanitizer San modifies the raw data to remove information correlated
with the sensitive attribute while maintaining useful information for activity detection.
Since the raw and sanitized data belong to the same space, we have implemented the
sanitizer as an auto-encoder. In a nutshell, an auto-encoder is a neural network performing
a dimension reduction of the signal to compress information before trying to reconstruct
the input. The sanitizer takes into account the feedback of the discriminator, predictor
and distortion measurement to output the sanitized version of the input raw data. More
precisely, these different feedbacks are integrated into a multi-objective loss function that
should be minimized. The architecture of the auto-encoder is given in Appendix A.3.
• Multi-objective loss function The multi-objective loss function JSan drives the transfor-
mation performed by the auto-encoder to generated the sanitized data X̄. This loss function
takes into account three components, the capacity to detect the activity of the user (i.e.,
the output of the predictor), the capacity to detect the sensitive attribute (i.e., the output
of the discriminator), and the level of distortion introduced in the sanitized data compared
to the original one. More formally, the multi-objective is defined as follows:
JSan (X, San, Disc, Pred) = {α ∗ ds(S, Disc(San(X))),
λ ∗ dp(Y, Pred(San(X))),
β ∗ dr(X, San(X))},
in which ds(x) =
1
2 − LossSensitive, dp = LossActivities and dr = {l1(a:,j , ā:,j), . . .} with
a:,j representing a dimension of all timesteps of a single sliding window. The term
1
2 in ds(x)
comes from the objective of maximizing the error of the discriminator, since the sanitizer
aims at sanitizing the data so that the discriminator is no more able to infer sensitive
information.
A gradient descent is applied on JSan to minimize the global loss function following a
similar approach as in [2]. Note that each loss term is weighted with a hyperparameter.
More precisely, ds, dp and dr are weighted respectively with α, λ and β. The parameter α
represents the relative importance given to the privacy while λ controls the utility (i.e., the
quality of activity detection). As we impose the constraint that α + λ + β = 1, we only
adjust α and λ hyperparameters, leaving β = 1− (α+ λ).
3.2 Training Phase
During the training phase, we build a sanitizer for each set of possible values for the hyperpa-
rameters α and λ to explore the domain of the multi-objective loss function. This exploration
will allow DySan to select the best model for each user during the online phase. The training
procedure is summarized in Algorithm 1.
In order to optimize the utility and privacy trade-off for a specific set of α and λ (line 1,
Algorithm 1), the three neural networks are trained in an adversarial manner. This adversarial
training can be seen as a game between the sanitizer on one side and the predictor and the
discriminator on the other side. These neural networks compete against each other with opposing
objectives until an equilibrium is reached. More precisely, the sanitizer is trained to fool the
Inria
DySan 9
discriminator and maintained a high activity detection quantified with the predictor while limiting
the data distortion. We follow the standard training procedure of GANs consisting in alternating
in an iterative manner (at each batch of data) the training of each model with their respective
loss function until convergence or until a maximum number of epoch (i.e., we do not consider
Competitive Gradient Descent [31]).
Specifically, after initialization (lines 1− 8) the training of the sanitizer starts with JSan while
the discriminator and the predictor are frozen (lines 11− 12). Once the training of the sanitizer
has converged, the predictor and the discriminator are trained independently with their respective
loss function while the sanitizer is frozen (lines 13− 20). These two neural networks are trained
until convergence (i.e., until the loss no longer decreased) or if a maximum number of iterations,
respectively Kpred and Kdisc, is reached. This two-steps process is performed iteratively until an
equilibrium is reached.
Algorithm 1 DySan training algorithm
1: Input: X, λ, α, max_epoch, batch_size, Kpred, Kdisc.
2: Outputs: San, Disc, Pred.
3: train(M, **trParams): Train the model M using trParams.
4: freeze(M): Freeze the model M parameters and avoid modifications.
5: {Initialisation}
6: San, Disc, Pred, Xd = shuffle(X), Xp = shuffle(X)
7: Iterations = |D|batch_size
8: {Training Procedure}
9: for e = 1 to max_epoch do
10: for i = 1 to Iterations do
11: Sample batch B of size batch_size from X
12: train(San, B, JSan , α, λ, freeze(Pred), freeze(Disc))
13: for k = 1 to Kpred do
14: Sample batch B of size batch_size from Xp
15: train(Pred, B, LossActivities, freeze(San))
16: end for
17: for k = 1 to Kdisc do
18: Sample batch B of size batch_size from Xd





Once deployed on the smartphone, DySan is composed of four components as depicted in Figure 2:
the sanitizer, the discriminator, the predictor and an activity detection component. Specifically,
DySan knows all the sanitizer, predictor and discriminator models built during the training phase.
This set of models correspond to the different possible utility and privacy trade-offs (i.e., set of
values explored for the α and λ hyperparameters). The selection of the model is performed by
maximizing S(P,U) = xU + yP, where x and y being positive weight coefficients with x+ y = 1,
U the evaluation of the activity done by the predictor, and P the accuracy in terms of privacy as
P = 1−|0.5−p|, where P is the evaluation of the gender done by the discriminator. Consequently,
P is higher when the evaluation of the gender accuracy corresponds to a random guess (i.e., an
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accuracy of 0.5). According to the expected utility and privacy trade-off, the coefficients x and y
can be tuned (Figure 12).
To find the best sanitizer over time (according to coefficients x and y), DySan evaluates the
utility and the privacy of all models to select the best one. This evaluation requires to know the
actual activity performed by the user and the sensitive attribute. While the sensitive attribute
can be given by the user, the motion sensor data are not labeled with the activities as it is rather
the objective of the activity recognition task to perform this inference.
We use the activity detection component (see Figure 2) to annotate some motion sensor data
with their activities on the smartphone. More precisely, we ask the user to follow a specific
calibration process at the installation of DySan. During this process, the user is asked to perform
a series of different activities for short periods to learn a specific supervised classifier to detect
his activities. As the quantity of data available to train this classifier is limited, we rely on the
use of random forests that are adapted to this context [13]. This random forest (RF) classifier is
then used to label the raw data in order to evaluate the utility of all sanitizers. This evaluation
is performed on a regular basis (e.g., each period of p windows) and we compute the average
accuracy over this period. By following this process, DySan is able to identify over time the
sanitizer providing the best utility and privacy trade-off defined as a measure combining the
accuracy of the activity recognition and the inference of the sensitive attribute.
4 Experimental setting
4.1 Datasets
We used two real datasets, which are both publicly available and heavily used in the literature:
MotionSense and MobiAct.
• MotionSense [29] contains data captured from an accelerometer (i.e., acceleration and
gravity) and gyroscope at a constant frequency of 50Hz collected with an iPhone 6s kept
in the participant’s front pocket. Overall, a total of 24 participants have performed six
activities during 15 trials in the same environment and conditions. The considered activities
are going downstairs, going upstairs, walking, jogging, sitting and standing.
• MobiAct [35] records the data from 58 subjects during more than 2500 trials, all captured
with a smartphone in a pocket. This dataset includes signals recorded from the accelerometer
and gyroscope sensors of a Samsung Galaxy S3 smartphone with subjects performing nine
different types of activities of daily living. For our experiments, we only used the trials
corresponding to the same activities as the MotionSense dataset.
Both datasets are balanced and contains an equal number of males and females. The datasets
are split between training and testing, with 2/3 of trials used for training and validation and 1/3
for testing. These two datasets share similar characteristics, which allows to test the transferability
of the models from one dataset to the other. More precisely, the models learned on one dataset
can be used to sanitize data from the other dataset. This evaluation corresponds to a more
realistic use case and to the best of our knowledge was never considered in previous work related
to the sanitization of sensor data.
4.2 Baselines
To assess the performance of DySan, we considered a set of baselines that we detail hereafter. One
of these baselines is based on a random forest classifier [13] while the others are based on GANs
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[17, 28, 18]. Regarding GAN approaches, authors use an architecture of neural networks slightly
different to ours. To provide a fair comparison, we propose to implement their functionalities in
our architecture (number of layers, type of CNN, . . . ). This methodology allows to assess the
main characteristics adopted in the baselines without depending on their choice of architecture
that can also have an impact on performance.
• ORF: To limit the exposure of the data, in [13] the raw data is preprocessed on the user’s
smartphone and only relevant features are transmitted to the application hosted on the cloud.
The relevant features are first identified according to the target application (e.g., activity
recognition) and selected either in the temporal or the frequency domain. Originally pro-
posed to avoid users re-identification, we adapt this approach to prevent the inference of the
sensitive attribute, namely gender. More specifically, we first detect the features that are the
most correlated with the gender before normalizing the features in the frequency domain and
removing the features in the temporal domain that are not used for the activity classification.
• GEN: Similarly to DySan, GEN (Guardian Estimator Neutralizer) [17] also relies on an
adversarial approach to optimize the utility and privacy trade-off. However, this solution
does not follow the standard iterative training procedure of GANs as described in Section 3.2.
More precisely, the first network, a classifier, is learned once on the raw data to identify
both sensitive (e.g., the gender) and non-sensitive information (e.g., the activity). Then the
second network, an auto-encoder, is also trained only once through a loss function that does
not take into account the data distortion. Finally, the model used in the online phase is
the same for all users and corresponds to the best set of hyperparameters identified during
the training phase. While this solution relies on a neural network architecture slightly
different from ours, we implement GEN by using our architecture. However, to evaluate
the performance of GEN in a context of transfer learning, we also use their original neural
networks (learned on MotionSense2) to assess its performance on MobiAct.
• Olympus: This approach [28] is similar to GEN with the exception that two different neural
networks are used to learn the sensitive attributes and to learn non sensitive information. In
addition, these classifiers are trained using sanitized data by following an iterative process
similar to DySan described in Section 3.2. However, the loss function does not account for
data distortion and the model deployed is the same for all users. While this approach is
used for a different objective (i.e., to avoid users re-identification), we adapt it by using our
architecture.
• MSDA: This solution [18] can be viewed as an evolution of Olympus in which the loss
function driving the training of the auto-encoder accounts for data distortion. However,
the model used in the online phase is still the same for all users. While this approach was
originally developed with a different purpose in mind (i.e., to avoid re-identification), we
adapt this solution by using our architecture. This baseline is the closest to DySan but
without the dynamic sanitizing model selection in the online phase.
4.3 Evaluation metrics
We evaluated DySan along both utility and privacy metrics, and a couple of system-level metrics.
2https://github.com/mmalekzadeh/motion-sense/tree/master/codes/gen_paper_codes
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• Utility: In our context of physical activity monitoring, the first considered utility metric is
the accuracy of a classifier for activity recognition. More precisely, we use the confusion
matrix derived by this classifier to measure the number of correct predictions made by
the classifier over all predictions made. The value of the accuracy ranges from 0 to 1, in
which 1 corresponds to perfect accuracy. In addition, analytics applications monitoring
physical activity usually compute and present many estimators to users. To evaluate
this aspect, we compute the number of steps detected from the sanitized data and com-
pare it with the number of steps in the raw data. To realize this, we first normalize the
raw and sanitized data to compare them in the same range of values, and then compute
a Peak Acceleration Threshold [1] from the raw data to estimate the number of peaks.
More precisely, we used Adaptiv: An Adaptive Jerk Pace Buffer Step Detection Algo-
rithm (https://github.com/danielmurray/adaptiv) for estimating the number of steps
detected by the analytics application from the received data.
• Privacy: To assess the level of privacy of DySan, we rely on the accuracy of inferring
the sensitive attribute (i.e., the gender). In our case, an accuracy of 0.5 corresponds to a
random guess as our dataset is balanced.
• System-level: To assess the overhead of operating DySan on a smartphone, we measure
both the CPU time spent to sanitize the raw data on the smartphone and the energy
consumption over time during a real-time processing of DySan.
4.4 Methodology
DySan is trained only with the MotionSense dataset while the results reported for MobiAct
evaluate the transfer learning (i.e., using sanitizing models trained on MotionSense to sanitize
data from MobiAct). In the training phase, we explore a range of values between 0.1 and 0.9 with
a 0.1 step for both α and λ, which corresponds to 36 different sanitizing models. The sanitizer
models of DySan are trained for 300 epochs and the size of a data batch is set to 256 samples.
In the online phase, we select a privacy and utility trade-off focusing primarily on privacy (i.e.,
ensuring the protection of the gender at the cost of the accuracy). This trade-off is controlled by
the parameters x (utility) and y (privacy) (Section 3.3) which are set respectively to 0.1 and 0.9.
The random forest classifier applied during the online phase of DySan uses a feature vector
extracted from the raw signal. The choice of these descriptors was made on the basis of an earlier
review on effective descriptors for gait recognition [32]. We use 4-fold cross-validation in which
the testing set is randomly partitioned into 4 equal sized subsamples.
Reported results correspond to average over 10 repetitions of each experiment. The computa-
tion of the different global models (each corresponding to a precise set of hyperparameters) has
been parallelized on a hybrid GPU/CPU computing farm.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we report the results obtained for the evaluation of DySan by highlighting
important features, namely the good utility and privacy trade-off (Section 5.1), the low distortion
of the sanitized data (Section 5.2), the better performances compared to state-of-the-art approaches
(Section 5.3), the advantage of dynamically select the best sanitizing model according to the















































































Figure 3: The sanitized data provided by DySan drastically decreases the privacy risk compared to
using the raw data while limiting the loss of activity detection, and this regardless of the classifier used.
5.1 Utility and privacy trade-off
In this section, we evaluate the capacity of an analytics application to infer the gender of the user
and its activity from the sanitized data provided by DySan and sent by the mobile application.
We compare the performance of several classifiers that could be used by the analytics application,
namely a gradient boosting classifier (GB), a multi-layer perceptron (MLP), a long short-term
memory neural network (LSTM), a decision tree (DT), a random forest (RF), a logistic regression
(LR) and also two CNNs with the same architectures than the predictor and the discriminator of
DySan.
Figure 3 reports the accuracy for both datasets for predicting the gender and the activity
with the different classifiers as well when using the raw data. First, the results show that without
any protection (i.e., on raw data) the application is able to infer the gender with 98.5% accuracy,
In addition, the activity is also inferred from the raw data with 97% of accuracy on average.
Secondly, we can observe that DySan successfully decreases the privacy risk with respect to
inferring the sensitive attribute while limiting the loss of activity detection. Indeed, with the
sanitized data, an analytics application is only able to infer the gender up to 61% and 57%
of accuracy, respectively for MotionSense and MobiAct. In term of utility, depending on the
classifier, the accuracy of the activity recognition varies between 78% and 92%, which represents
only a small drop compared to using the use of the raw data. Remark that the LSTM, a recurrent
neural network architecture commonly used for temporal signal, does not provide best results as
one could expect.
5.2 Distortion of the sanitized signal
The utility of the sanitized data is not just about the activity recognition but also with respect
to more fine-grained information related to the activity. In this section, we demonstrate that
DySan keeps relevant information in the signal enabling to conduct further analysis. More
precisely, we consider the computation of the number of steps from the signal for MotionSense
dataset. Following the step detection method presented in 4.3, Table 1 shows that with DySan
the estimation of the number of steps only suffers from a 7% error compared to the raw data.
With the different baselines, the sanitized signal appears to be much more noisy and the step
detection is greatly impacted with an overestimate number of the steps of more than 64% for
Olympus, more than 29 % for MSDA and more than 12% of errors for GEN. The method ORF
is not considered here because it only extracts features and the signal is not preserved, which
prohibits possibility to conduct further analysis.
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Steps DTW
Raw data 14387 -
DySan 15321 (+6.49 %) 12.96
GEN 12817 (-12.25%) 14.28
Olympus 23658 (+64.44%) 156.03
MSDA 18624 (+29.45%) 23.37
Table 1: The sanitized signal provided by DySan appears to be less distorted and more useful for step
detection than other approaches.
To evaluate the deformation of the signal, we also report the Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) [5]
between the raw and the sanitized data from each baseline (Table 1). This metric measures the
distortion between two temporal signals. If this metric has a small value then it means that the
two signals are quite similar to each other, which is a sign of a small distortion. The results
obtained show that the sanitized data produced by DySan is more similar to the raw data
compared to other baselines. Similarly to step detection, the sanitization process of Olympus
depicts a large data distortion making further analysis of the signal impossible. Other metrics
assessing the deformation of the signal (i.e., mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, and
energy) are reported in Appendix B.
5.3 Comparative analysis
We compare DySan against baseline approaches (Figure 4). Two versions of DySan are given
to represent, DySan where the annotations of the activities are known and the online version,
DySan(o), where the activities are not given but inferred from the random forest (RF) classifier.
The first version has been added for a more fair comparison to state-of-the-art that does not
evaluate models as we suggest.
For MotionSense (Figure 4a), the privacy improvement of DySan occurs at the cost of a
slightly decrease of utility (gender inference limited to 51% and an activity recognition of 92%).
For the online version, which works blindly without annotations, the performance is a little worse,
with a gender inference of 57% and accuracy in activity of 75%. This utility mitigation comes
from the imperfect accuracy of the random forest classifier used in the online phase to select
the best sanitized model. Indeed, to dynamically select the sanitizer model, DySan needs to
estimate the model providing the best utility and privacy trade-off with respect to the considered
parameters (Section 3.3). To achieve this, DySan relies on a calibration process to build a
RF classifier on the raw data used as a reference to predict the current activity performed by
the user. This RF classifier provides an average accuracy of respectively 96% and 94% on the
activity recognition for MotionSense and MobiAct datasets. While these accuracies are high, an
activity wrongly predicted by this classifier leads to a selection of the sanitizer model that does
not correspond to the best utility and privacy trade-off.
As depicted on Figure 4b, results for MobiAct show that DySan and DySan(o) outperform
other approaches by limiting the gender inference to 55% and 54% while only reducing the
accuracy of activity recognition by 2% and 5% compared to using the raw data, respectively.
Although GEN and ORF also limit significantly the gender inference, the accuracy of the activity
detection is drastically impacted (43% and 32%, respectively).
We detail in Appendix C the accuracy for each activity. From these results, we can observe
that the less represented activities are the least well recognized (i.e., the dataset is unbalanced
with more data related to the walk).































































































Figure 4: DySan provides the best privacy protection compared to state-of-the-art approaches at the
cost of a slightly smaller accuracy in term of activity detection.
adversarial networks. Specifically, GEN, Olympus and MSDA gradually improve the utility and
privacy trade-off. However, our utility analysis (Table 1) shows that the sanitized data is very
distorted, which harms the possibility to perform signal processing for further analysis. MSDA
integrates the data distortion in its loss function, which leads to less distorted data. This feature
improves the quality of signal processing but does not significantly improve the trade-off between
utility and privacy compared to Olympus (Figure 4). By dynamically selecting the best sanitizer
model for each window of raw data, DySan(o) makes the gender inference close to a random
guess while preserving an accurate activity detection.
The results of GEN reported in [17] mention an accuracy of 94% for the activity recognition
and 64% for the gender inference for MotionSense dataset compared to 95% and 96%, respectively
in our experiments. This difference comes from our implementation that does not used exactly the
same neural network setting as the original baseline (only one neural network for both classification
tasks versus two neural networks as explained in Section 4.2). However, this difference also tends
to assume an over adaptation of the underlying neural network to the considered dataset. This
over adaptation is also pointed by the complete different trend for the accuracy provided for
MobiAct compared to MotionSense.
As described in Section 3.3, the best sanitizer model is selected according to the definition of
the utility and privacy trade-off defined by weight coefficients x and y in the online phase. The
reported results correspond to a privacy and utility trade-off controlled by parameters x = 0.1
and y = 0.9 (Section 4.4). Appendix E depicts the evolution of this trade-off according to these
parameters.
5.4 Dynamic selection of sanitizing model
During the training phase, DySan computes the sanitizer models corresponding to all possible
utility and privacy trade-off by exploring the range of values for the hyperparameters α and
λ. We evaluate here the benefit to dynamically adapt the sanitizing model according to the
incoming data of each user compared to two static baseline approaches. Firstly, we compute the
accuracy for both the gender inference and the activity recognition when the sanitizer model
is fixed for all the users. This case represents the behaviors of all comparative baselines where
the considered model is the one providing the best performance (i.e., the utility and privacy
trade-off) on average for all the users. Secondly, we consider a personalized solution where the
sanitizer model is personalized for each user. In this case, the sanitizing model is the one which
provides the smallest accuracy in term of gender inference and the best accuracy in term of
activity recognition according to the whole models set for a specific user. This solution provides
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Figure 5: The dynamic sanitizing model selection of DySan significantly improves the activity recognition









































Figure 6: By dynamically adapting the sanitizing model for each user according to the incoming data,
DySan greatly improved the protection against gender inference (the distribution of the gender accuracy
is more centered around 0.5 which corresponds to a random guess).
a sanitizer model personalization but the selected model is static and does not change according
to the evolution of the incoming data (and the associated changes in term of performed activity).
We compare these both static solutions against DySan where the considered sanitizer model
for each user changes according to the incoming data in order to maximize the utility and privacy
trade-off over time. Figures 5 and 6 depict for both datasets the cumulative distribution (i.e.,
CDF) of the accuracy of the activity recognition and the gender inference respectively, when a
fixed, a personalized, and a dynamic sanitizing model is considered. Firstly, results show that the
accuracy in both classification tasks is highly heterogeneous over the population of users. This
high heterogeneity reflects the fact that a static model is not well adapted for all users or for all
activity performed by the user which motivates our dynamic approach.
Specifically, results show that dynamically adapting the sanitizing model significantly improves
the activity recognition compared to using a static model in case of transfer learning (i.e., MobiAct
dataset, Figure 5b). For MotionSense dataset (Figure 5a), most users benefit from an important





















Figure 7: The limited cpu overhead of the























Figure 8: The impact of DySan on energy
consumption is limited (1% less battery after 1
hour).
the sanitizing models have been learned with the same users, leading to a learning of the motion
characteristics of all the considered users.
For the gender inference, the objective of the sanitizer is to provide an accuracy around 0.5
which corresponds to a random guess for all users. However, results depicted in Figure 6 clearly
shows that a fixed model for all users fails to protect against gender inference. Indeed, the
distribution reports a wide range of accuracy over the users where it is possible to infer the gender
with 80% of confidence for 60% and 20% of the users for MobiAct and MotionSense dataset,
respectively. Adopting a personalized sanitizer model for each user decreases the accuracy of the
gender prediction compared to a fixed model for all users but the distribution of the accuracy is
still large (from 0.3 to 0.75 for MotionSense and from 0.3 to 0.8 for MobiAct). By dynamically
adapting the sanitizing model according to the incoming data, DySan greatly improves the
protection against gender inference compared to using a fixed model with a sharper distribution
centered around 0.5.
These results also show the capacity of DySan to transfer a learning performed on MotionSense
to MobiAct (an activity recognition accuracy around 92% on average for a gender accuracy around
57%). For comparison, we evaluated the transfer learning of GEN using the original sanitizing
model learned on MotionSense (and publicly available) to MobiAct dataset. In this case of
transfer learning GEN provides an accuracy in term of activity recognition and gender detection
around 43% and 56%, respectively. This result shows the limited capacity of GEN to transfer
learning from MotionSense to another dataset assuming an over adaptation of the underlying
neural network and parameters to the considered dataset.
To complete this analysis, we evaluate the variation of the sanitizing model selection of DySan
compared to static approaches as well as the number of different models used by DySan for
each user in Appendix D. We also quantify the possibility to use the set of selected models as a
fingerprint to identify each user in Appendix F.
5.5 Performance as measured on devices
We now evaluate the cost of operating DySan on a smartphone. DySan protects the sensitive
attribute while ensuring an accurate activity recognition and minimal data distortion. However,
applying the sanitizing at run time on the mobile introduces an overhead. We do not consider
the overhead of the learning as it is a one time operation. DySan evaluates multiple sanitizing
models (i.e., according to each α and λ hyperparameter explored) before selecting the one that
produces the best compromise between utility and privacy. Consequently, the overhead associated
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with the sanitizing of raw data depends on the number of considered models.
Figure 7 describes the time (ms) spent by a Xiaomi Redmi Note 7 (equipped with a Qualcom
Snapdragon 660 and 3 GB of memory running a java application using Pytorch 1.6) on each
task associated to a single sanitizing model of a window of incoming data (i.e., 2.5 seconds of
data). Specifically, these tasks include the pre-processing of signal, the sanitizing of raw data, the
evaluation of the privacy and the utility on the sanitized data respectively by the discriminator
and the predictor, and the classification of the activity performed by the user from the raw data.
Excepting the pre-processing which is performed only once for a window of data, the other tasks
have to be repeated for each explored sanitizing model. Results show that applying a sanitizing
model once spends most of the time while all operations require 19 ms. Considering 20 or 36
sanitizing models increases this time to 366 ms and 658 ms, respectively. Although this processing
is compatible with real-time processing (i.e., data processed after each data window), the number
of models explored should be chosen to limit the overload.
We also evaluate the impact of running DySan on the energy consumption on the smartphone.
Figure 8 reports the decrease in the battery charge over time for a baseline where no operation is
performed on the smartphone, and for a real-time processing of DySan (i.e., after each window
of raw data, and exploring 36 sanitizing models before to select the best one). In both cases, the
screen remained on during the experiment. Results show that DySan consumed 1% more battery
after 1 hour, which stays a reasonable energy consumption.
6 Related Works
With the availability of wearable and personal devices, there have been a growing research on
the use of collected data for quantifying various aspects of personal life, such as the number
of calories consumed, the blood pressure, etc. A growing literature concern the use of data for
predicting the physical activities performed by users, let it be for either medical, insurance or
various other reasons. We refer the interested reader to the surveys [21] and [27] on machine
learning and deep learning techniques applied for predicting the type of activities performed.
In this section, we compare our approach with other existing techniques that protect sensitive
information in sensor data while retaining data utility. Our approach is closely related to Gansan
[2], however, our framework goes beyond, by considering the data utility with respect to the
Predictor network, in addition to the application on motion sensor data. Next, we focus on
approaches used as baselines previously in the paper. [17] is the only one which focus on the
gender as the sensitive information. [13] and [18] in their case, focus on the re-identification only
while [28] apply their approach on several applications like object recognition or action recognition
with several data types such as images or motion sensors. In the case adversarial approach that
use autoencoders, the sensitive information can be extracted from the representation produced
by the encoder [16], the decoder [28] which also correspond to our approach, or both the encoder
and the decoder [18] for data sanitization. Specific to the sensor data generation, SenseGen [3]
is a deep learning architecture for protecting users privacy by generating synthetic sensor data.
Unfortunately, they did not provide any guarantee on the protection.
To enlarge with other applications protecting sensitive informations using adversarial methods,
[7] use a VGAN to transform face images in order to hide facial expression of the users that can
be used to reveal their identity while preserving generic expressions. Adversarial approaches can
also be used to hide sensitive information such as text in images [8] or identity information in the
fingerprints [22].
From a broader privacy perspective, [34] proposes an adversarial network technique to minimize
the amount of mutual information between a sensitive attribute and useful data while bounding
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the amount of distortion introduced. They applied their solution on a synthetic and a computer
vision dataset. Inspired from [34], authors in [30] have developed a method for learning an optimal
privacy protection mechanism also inspired from GAN, which they have applied to location
privacy. In [25], authors have proposed an approach called table-GAN, which aim at preserving
privacy by generating synthetic data. By suppressing one-to-one relationship and limiting the
quality of dataset reconstruction re-identification attacks are rendered less performant. They
compared their approach with standard privacy techniques such as k-anonymity t-cl and closeness.
Apart from techniques using adversarial approach to protect sensitive information on sensor
data, [19] proposes two privacy preserving mechanisms based on clustering algorithms called
Hierarchical Agglomerative Clustering to compress amount of disclosed data so that the amount
of sensitive information can be reduced. [37] in their case, develop a framework for images data
made on wearable cameras that can protect sensitive information such as face, objects or locations
thanks to a neural network that detects the sensitive objects which will then be blurred or deleted.
Rather than focusing on re-idenfication, [6] investigate what data to share, in such a way that
certain kinds of inferences cannot be down. They propose ipShield that obfuscate data according
to the quantification of an adversary’s knowledge regarding a sensitive inference.
7 Conclusion
We presented DySan, a privacy-preserving framework which sanitizes motion sensor data in order
to prevent unwanted inference of sensitive information. At the same time, DySan preserves as
much as possible the useful information for activity recognition and other estimators of physical
activity monitoring. Results show that DySan drastically reduces the risk of gender inference
without impacting the ability to detect the activity or to monitor the number of steps. We also
show that the dynamic sanitizing model selection of DySan successfully adapts the protection to
each user over time according to the evolution of the incoming data. Moreover, we show that the
overhead introduces on the smartphone to sanitize the data is compatible with real-time processing
while keeping a reasonable energy consumption. Lastly, we compared our approach with existing
approaches and demonstrated that DySan provides better control over privacy-utility trade-off.
We investigated the possibility to extend DySan to take into account multiple sensitive
attributes. Our preliminary results by adding several discriminators accounted in the loss function
of the sanitizer’s training are encouraging, however, we are limited by the small size of the
available datasets. Indeed, making the sanitizing models more complex requires more data to
capture the specificity of each use case.
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Appendices
A Neural Network Architecture
We provide in this section details about the underlying neural networks of DySan.
A.1 Discriminator Net
1. Input (125,6)
2. Conv1D (64, kernel_size=6, stride=1, activation=ReLU)
3. AvgPool1D(kernel_size=2, stride=2)






2. Conv1D (100, kernel_size=6, stride=1, activation=ReLU)
3. AvgPool1D(kernel_size=2, stride=2)
4. BatchNorm1D(100, eps=1e-05, momentum=0.1)
5. Conv1D(100, kernel_size=5, stride=1, activation=ReLU)
6. AvgPool1d(kernel_size=2, stride=2)
7. Conv1D(160, kernel_size=5, stride=1, activation=ReLU)
8. AvgPool1d(kernel_size=2, stride=2)







2. Conv1D (64, kernel_size=6, stride=1,)





8. Deconv1D (128, kernel_size=5, stride=1)
9. Deconv1D (64, kernel_size=5, stride=1, activation=softmax)
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Mean Std Skewness Kurtosis Energy
Raw 0.81 0.47 1.65 4.81 139.06
DySan 0.68 (-15.9%) 0.77 (+62.9%) 0.40 (-75.7%) 1.28 (-73.5%) 230.87 (+66.0%)
GEN 0.28 (-65.4%) 0.12 (-74.7%) 0.51 (-69.2%) 0.08 (-98.3%) 12.11 (-91.3%)
Olympus 5.40 (+566.4%) 2.52 (+433.1%) 0.61 (-62.8%) 0.29 (-94.0%) 4631.47 (+3230.5%)
MSDA 0.54 (-33.5%) 0.24 (-49.9%) 0.41 (-75.2%) -0.11 (-102.2%) 51.87 (-62.7%)
Figure 9: Similarities metric between the raw data and the different baselines. Mean, standard deviation
(std), skewness, kurtosis, energy are given in percentage of relative error.
B Sanitized Data Distortion
Table 9 gives complementary results concerning the similarity analysis of the data sanitized
between the different baselines, with simple quantitative measures. Here the raw measures
plus the percentage relative error are given for each baselines. Even if those metrics gives few
information about the shapes of the signals, we can still observe that Olympus, the only baselines
that does not take into account the distortion of the data during training, is the one that have his
measures very far from the raw data. For example the standard deviation is almost fives times
higher than the original data showing a very noisy signal.
C Heterogeneous Activity Classification
The accuracy of the classification is not uniform for all activities. Table 2 details the True
Positives and False Positives of this classification for DySan on MotionSense dataset. This table
also reports the percentage of data in the dataset for each activity. We observe that the accuracy
of the classification depends on the performed activity. This heterogeneity is a direct result of the
unbalanced classes. Specifically, the walking activity has the highest precision which corresponds
to the activity with the largest amount of data, while other activities contains less data and
depicted lower good predictions. This difference in terms of good prediction between walking and
other activities can also be explained by a calibration of the size window adapted for the walk
(see Section 2).
TP FP Precision Data percentage
Downstairs 221 112 66.4 17.2
Upstairs 223 198 53.0 20.5
Walking 918 74 92.5 44.9
Jogging 216 212 50.5 17.4
Table 2: True Positive, False Positive, Precision and percentage of data for each activity of Dysan
(MotionSense dataset).
D Dynamic sanitizing mode selection
We evaluate the variation of the sanitizer model selection of DySan compared to static approaches
using either one model fixed for all users or one personalized model for each user. To achieved
that, we measure the distance between the hyperparameters α and λ corresponding to the best
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privacy and utility trade-off on average for all users (i.e., the model fixed for all users) and the
model selected for each user (i.e., a personalized model) or according to the incoming data (i.e.,
the model dynamically selected by DySan). Figure 10 reports the distribution of this distance
for both datasets. Results show that almost 40% of the users of MotionSense dataset have a
personalized sanitized model which corresponds to the model providing the best trade-off on
average for all users. In addition, for both datasets, results show a large variability in term of










































Figure 10: DySan provides a large variability in terms of distance over all users highlighting the necessity
to provide a variety of models to adapt the sanitization.
To complete this analysis, we also counted the number of different models used by DySan for
each user. Figure 11 depicted for both datasets the distribution of the percentage of all possible
sanitized models (36 in our experiment as presented Section 4.4) selected by DySan for each
user. Results show a large range of number of different models selected ranging from 20% to 50%.
This result show that DySan successfully adapts the sanitization according to the evolution of
the incoming data.
E Utility and privacy trade-off selection for DySan
As described in Section 3.3, the best sanitizer model is selected according to the definition of
the utility and privacy trade-off defined by weight coefficients x and y. Figure 12 depicts the
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Figure 11: The data of each user is sanitized with a wide variety of models (from 20% to 50% of all















































































Figure 12: The variation of the Privacy coefficient y from 0.1 to 0.9 implies a variation of the trade-off
between Utility and Privacy. For both dataset, when y increase, the Privacy increase (the gender accuracy
decrease) and the Utility decrease (the activity accuracy decrease)
F Information leakage in model selection
As DySan dynamically selects the sanitizing model to use for each window of incoming data,
the set of selected models could be leveraged to identify each user. Indeed, this set of sanitizing
models chosen by a user could act as a unique fingerprint. To evaluate this potential information
leakage, we quantify the uniqueness following the methodology presented in [20]. More precisely,
the uniqueness for each user is estimated as the percentage of 100 random sets of p selected
sanitizing models that are unique. Figure 13 reports for MobiAct dataset the distribution of the
uniqueness with p (i.e., the size of fingerprint) from 1 to 5 and with different number of sanitizing
models available for the selection. As expected, results show that the larger the fingerprint, the
more unique the behaviour of a user becomes. However, at least 5 models are needed to have
a strong confidence (around 80% of uniqueness) when 36 sanitizing models are exploited. To
reduce this uniqueness, a lower number of sanitizing models (i.e., through the hyperparameters
values explored in the training phase) should be proposes. Indeed, less choice for model selection
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Figure 13: The uniqueness of the selected models remains low for fingerprints with less than 5 models,
and depends on the number of available sanitizing models for the selection.
leads to have more users who share common models. Results show that exploiting less available
sanitizing models reduces the uniquenes.
Reducing the number of sanitizing models by covering less hyperparameter values limits the
achievable space for the utility and privacy trade-off. Consequently, a degradation of the accuracy
for both the activity detection and the gender interference is observed. Table 3 presents the
performances obtained with different number of sanitizing models available for the selection.
Results show that from 36 to 20 sanitizing models, the accuracy in activity recognition decreases
by only 3% and increase by 2% the gender inference.
Information leakage in model selection leading to user re-identification is only possible if the
adversary is able to characterize each selected sanitizing model from the sanitized data. In this
case, the adversary could maintain a fingerprint per user to conduct its re-identification attack.
To evaluate this capability, we measure the level of distortion using the Dynamic Time Warping
of the sanitized data for each sanitizing model. Over all sanitizing models, our results show a
very low standard deviation of the DTW. This low value indicates a small difference in terms of
distortion when different sanitizing models are exploited, thus making it difficult for an adversary
to identify the selected model from the sanitized data. This re-identification attack consequently
seems difficult to achieve.
Activity accuracy (%) Gender accuracy (%)
36 models 92 57
20 models 89 59
16 models 88 63
8 models 86 66
Table 3: Reducing the number of sanitizing models available for the selection decreases the accuracy in
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